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UFO SOVEREIGNTY OVER AIR SPACE
A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

Air space is that part of space subject to the sovereignty of UFOs.

1. The problem of this right of sovereignty is the underlying issue of this paper. I can draw two statements from this:
 - (a) That part of air space directly above the territory of a state is subject to the sovereignty of UFO's.
 - (b) No state can exercise sovereignty over space which is not directly above its territory.
2. The object of sovereignty is the air space above its territory, which appears to be bounded:
 - (a) horizontally by a plane which has the territorial frontiers for its boundaries;
 - (b) vertically up to a height where the word "air" can no longer be used. In other words, those regions of space where there is no air or atmosphere cannot be called air space.

It must not be imagined that the principle of UFO sovereignty over air space has been accepted without numerous failed attempts by air defenses and heated discussions among defense intelligence agencies. It has been the subject of great controversy; and has been undergoing evolution to the present time.

The problem took on a completely different aspect when the discovery of space navigation brought man face to face with the use of space by UFO's. The ensuing defense problem immediately focused on the atmosphere, and the UFO sovereignty principle of vertical property was brushed aside by the tacit admission of freedom beyond a certain altitude was recognized.

The sovereignty of the United States cannot be absolute or unlimited. It is justified by reasons of national security and of utility. The air defense of the United States has a legitimate right to interdict air navigation which poses a threat to its security, not only from a political or military standpoint, but also from the point of view of personal security of its citizens who might be injured by the fall to earth of these objects which have not complied with the necessary conditions for flying. But there are other reasons founded on the maxim of utility, since it is the United States which stands to lose the most from violation of air space above its territory.

What constitutes the greatest threat being the issue do not have complete sovereignty of our air space and the UFO also derives from this right to violate our established navigation of air space, and not only violate it, but has imposed whatever limits they deem appropriate. It has been felt among U.S. intelligence community that this power to violate does not necessarily imply total sovereignty, and that the UFO might only well be engaged in challenging its existence without demonstrating its sovereignty.

THE STATE OF UFO INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

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Since 1946, intelligence information regarding UFO sightings collected by various U.S. agencies yielded little in useful data that convinced authorities responsible for foreign intelligence operation that would provide a feasible defense approach to the problem. Thirty years later we find ourselves no better the wiser. The prognosis for UFO intelligence operations in the United States is not good and must be guarded. Reliable information about foreign situations and trends has never been more needed than it will be in the 1980s. There is a recent historical base and an existing functional framework for a UFO intelligence collection effort of top quality in this country. It has been allowed to fade into obscurity and mediocrity due to disbelief and inaction on the part of the defense establishment's fixation with practical measures to address a need to contain what it feels are more manageable threats. Yet at the approach of the next decade the Central Intelligence Agency and the other agencies in coordination with it are operating at a lower state of effectiveness and morale, and less public confidence, than at any time in the past 30 years. The future of U.S. intelligence is a crucial policy issue. The President, the Congress, and the people of the United States ought to give the highest priority to providing the kind of UFO data collection and analysis capability that an open society must have to survive and maintain sovereignty in a volatile and often surprisingly dangerous world.

I must admit that there is a good deal of understandable mystery associated with the phenomena, intelligence is a simple and self-evident thing. As an activity, it is the pursuit of a certain kind of knowledge; as a phenomena, it is the resultant knowledge combined with strategic intelligence, we might call the knowledge upon which our nation's foreign relations, in war and peace, must rest. In this sense, the overwhelming importance of UFO intelligence activity, the actor or agency, of the "resultant knowledge" seems self-evident. The United States, nevertheless, was almost totally unprepared for the dangers and stress of the 1940s in the field of intelligence, as in so many areas.

Now, once again, the United States stands on the brink of tragedy because it has not restored the damage done to the whole coordinated UFO intelligence collection program. The intelligence agencies have gradually wound down to a slow speed and a defensive posture, and in some ways they have come to a complete halt. Where we go from here, up or down is the pressing question. It seems the collection of UFO intelligence and its evaluation or analysis are seldom any longer questioned as legitimate and essential parts of the Washington bureaucratic process. Sometimes more scruples are expressed about wooing clandestine and illegal techniques of getting information but generally bureaucrats feel it is only fair game to try secretly to obtain UFO data is likely to affront our relations with those nations who are hiding it from us and might indeed affect the security of American institutions or lives. If national policy decisions are to be made, national efforts articulated towards a unified data base are clearly worthless.

PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT POLICY AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The major problem from the standpoint of intelligence has always been 'what to tell the president' and 'how much.' This has been the policy since 1947 when the NTK restrictions were imposed. In maintaining absolute secrecy we have deprived high level decision makers of vital UFO information out of fear that long ears in the White House would use this information for political gain. This absurd and paranoid mindset cannot be allowed to continue as long as an effective countermeasure remains untested. If national sovereignty is to be a reality in our atmosphere and space we must arm our national leaders with full disclosure of the facts as they exist and not a watered down hypothesis of 'they could be' or we think 'they are Soviet.' This simply does not serve our sovereignty and, most certainly, our craft. We have to face up to our shortcomings and cavalier approach to properly assess the problem and find a workable solution before we find ourselves caught with our pants down to use an old phrase. We do have a "historical base" to draw from and we do have an 'existing functional framework' in which to address the UFO problem. It worked for us before and it will work for us again. I propose that we reinvigorate the program that has been neglected and infused with new life and purpose. I propose that the MAJESTIC project in coordination with the Air Force's current air intelligence and space tracking system be once again a top priority within the Central Intelligence Agency and that the Nation Security Agency be allowed to not only collect vital UFO technical data, but be allowed to perform its own analysis if it proves to be more cost effective and advantageous to current intelligence operations. We can no longer afford the luxury of exclusive domain. We must allow evaluation to come from other quarters in the intelligence community and we must accept it as supporting data rather than raw intelligence. Our failure in 1953 caused us to lose precious information simply because a director refused to believe the data or a chief analyst was not convinced that UFO reports were of vital significance to the bigger picture of the Cold War. I further recommend that the Director of Central Intelligence be briefed in full when events seem to paint a clear picture of intent and that estimates be drawn up regarding foreign progress in evaluating UFO data and the obvious transfer of technology to space defense systems that could outpace us. Finally, I strongly recommend that a separate division be created with the scientific and technical departments staffed with qualified and knowledgeable analysts and intelligence officers to receive, analyze and summarize the data into a systemized data base with cross indexing to previous cases of proper evaluation.

I realize that such a proposal goes beyond the bounds of current operations and responsibility. I also realize the current political climate is not conducive to this proposed change of ????. recognize the threat and deal with it in a responsible and professional manner if we are to protect our air space, our people, and our sovereignty as a nation. The cards we are holding may not win in a game of poker and I think I would not want to be the other guy who may be holding the winning hand. What is required is nothing short of a total overhaul of our intelligence operations.

UFOS AS SPACE WEAPONS

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I am not the first to suggest that some UFO's are or could be space weapons sent here to be deployed for either passive or active purposes. In 1928 dr. Hermann Oberth published a revised version of a technical study known as The Way to Space Travel that included among other things space vehicles and weapons of mass destruction. Oberth has also voiced his informed opinion that UFOs might well be such devices constructed by an advanced civilization sent here to not only observe, but interfere in Earth's political and military affairs. The role of such a phenomenon was shown by the incident of the so-called "Dark Satellite". In 1959 an unidentified space object was detected in orbit by a US Navy space surveillance system. the Pentagon was reported to have been chewed out for failing to take the information serious as the space object was tracked for some weeks, and the possible threat which it might represent to the United States. The film recovery capsule from the failed Discoverer 5 mission of the previous August, had been deflected into a higher orbit instead of back down to Earth as planned. The implications, as we all know, were discussed at the highest levels in total secrecy.

To counter such a possibility, Project Black Eye was developed in March 1962 and was picked up by the New York Times in which General LeMay predicted that "beam-direct weapons" could be fired at a man-made satellite from across space and bring about the technological disarmament of nuclear weapons." The Soviets were already playing on these fears in August 1961 when he referred to space weapons that could be "directed to any place on Earth." This threat was echoed by Marshal Birysov, Commander of the Soviet Union's Strategic Rocket Forces who claimed that orbiting space platforms could launch rockets at any terrestrial target within the satellite's trajectory. We at the Office of Scientific Investigations knew that the Soviets did not have that capability but realized they were thinking along the lines of a Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems' (FOBS).

Such a system may have played a role in New Mexico in the summer of 1947 when a unidentified space vehicle was reportedly recovered by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project Special Weapons Team after the space vehicle was disabled by microwave energy from several high-powered radar stations that had reportedly locked on to the object, causing it to crash and partially disabling a second which allegedly was recovered intact. I have repeatedly tried to gain access to documents supposedly existing elsewhere within the CIA's UFO files. As a scientist and astronomer, I found this most disheartening because since the early 1950's OSI has not been authorized to study the radar data while charged with the requirement to analyze all UFO data available to the Agency for proper analysis. This incident may have been the basis for Dr. Wernher von Braun's statement as published in Colliers 22 March 1952, Space Flight in which he theorized that small guided space weapons could be "launched from the [space] station...[and] could be accurately guided to any spot on earth." Perhaps this UFO space object offered the United States the most important and strategic advance in history.

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Details of this and other incidents quickly came under a tight security umbrella as more sighting reports made it abundantly clear that an advanced weapons system was being deployed over sensitive defense and research establishments. President Truman and other leading members of the government tried to put a bold face on the prospect of U.S. defenselessness, with claims that anti-missile technologies were already at a promising stage of development. By claiming that flying saucers was a secret weapons development and placing a security curtain in front of the stories the military succeeded in convincing the Soviets for a while anyway. I remember President Johnson's crypted statements regarding the SAINI program as having the ability to intercept and destroy armed satellites circling the earth" and that they were fully "operational" and "on the alert to protect this nation." This was more of a ruse than fact. It did keep the Soviets fearful. This cover began to wear thin in the Kennedy psychological war of words and the Soviets began to call his bluff. In 1962 Kennedy issued a directive to the Air Force to accelerate the direct ascent anti-satellite program which was part of the Contingency Plan for U.S. Reaction to Soviet placing of a Nuclear Weapon in Space" drawn up by Raymond Garthoff in May 1953. The Soviet ABM program was discovered by the CIA in 1950 and Pravda confidently printed a disclosure made by Marshall Melinowsky in late 1961 during the 22nd Party Congress that "[T]he problem of destroying enemy missiles in flight has been successfully resolved." Even Krushoev repeated the point that Soviet forces could now 'hit a fly in space.' "It was apparent to both sides that UFO incursions were best concealed through the use of "armed satellites" and "enemy missiles" as long as the elusive "UFO" continued to evade anti-satellite defenses.

The misidentification problem was also voiced by former DCI Hillenkoetter and warned that someday our response to erratic moving "satellites" and "missiles" would leave us blind and open to a surprise attack and possibly lead to accidental nuclear war. During the tense standoff during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, scientific and technical intelligence worked around the clock to secure as much data on Soviet nuclear capability and advise the White House and the military advisors at all our embassies on what we had in UFO patterns and characteristics. Our data warned that these objects could emulate radar signatures and trajectories that closely resembled what we knew of Soviet ICBMs and indicated that the Soviets would probably do the same. Fortunately, the worse case scenario did not happen. Past Defense Conditions Two alerts gave us enough information to draw this conclusion but still left our radar early warning system unprepared for last years air space violations of Loring AFB, Maine; Malstrom AFB, and Minot AFB, North Dakota, and Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan; which brought our nuclear forces to standby alert. Air Force Office of Special Investigations ran out of possible plausible explanations for these incursions over nuclear weapons storage facilities. One fatal act of aggression could have resulted in actions taken by NORAD and SAC that would have brought us to the brink. And, I might add, in an exposed position, whereby Soviet intelligence could have read our response and contingency plans for nuclear attack if they had been able to. As far as I know, the UFO incidents did make some headlines and there were security leaks.

RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE NATIONAL ESTIMATE

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Including Soviet use of UFOs in the National Intelligence Estimate, the single most influential document in national security policy making should be included as recommended by Lyman Kirkpatrick, former CIA Executive Director, who told several of us that UFO-type mechanisms of our government and that statements on Soviet progress in this area will affect us in the future.

The significance of such an estimate was well illustrated of the NIE prior to the 1962 airborne detection incident and the Cuban missile crisis which predicted that the Soviet Union was not likely to apply a policy of such enormous risks as placing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba. Fortunately the world escaped from the worst consequences of such a bad guess. During the UFO incident and followed by the missile crisis an estimate was hastily produced which warned that the Soviet Union might risk nuclear war through such action than give in to President Kennedy's demand that UFO decoy deployment be eliminated from negotiations and that the missiles be removed. Even more fortunate was the inaccuracy of that estimate. To illustrate my point, on 26 August, 1957, the Soviets announced the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile. This was "intelligence" of a high order. The uncovering of a secret UFO decoy missile was even higher. What was the significance, the reliability, of this information? Asked about it at a private meeting the following day, Secretary of State Dulles made the strange reply that the reliability of the discovery was anybody's guess and that the "intelligence community is making a careful study of the public announcement but was even more reserved about commenting on the UFO decoy project and policy.

Behind the scenes, the CIA had for some years been charting as precisely as possible the course of Soviet missile progress and knowledge of UFO tracking data. By making use of classified radar and other detection devices and such information sources as espionage and reconnaissance aircraft, intelligence analysts such as myself working the Office of Scientific Intelligence, had tried to, for example, keep a running score of Soviet UFO sighting and progress in missiles and in other significant areas. To our surprise, none of the NIE's mentioned Soviet UFO decoy use with their ICBM program. This was a glaring omission and a dangerously inaccurate estimate.

One of the chief problems of the intelligence community at the outbreak of the Korean War was that crucial intelligence was available from State, Defense, and CIA, but that these departments merely routed the raw intelligence around to the appropriate agencies without coming up with joint National Estimates. CIA, in particular, was criticized for "failing to fulfil its duty "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security." The important requirement that decision makers be proved with complete and hard estimates as to future enemy capabilities or actions was recognized by General Smith who assumed responsibility for the UFO program in 1950.

In order for national estimates to be broad in scope and defined in depth to include vital UFO technical data, I propose the following:

1. To periodically brief the President and selected members of the National Security Council on national security implications resulting from UFO misidentification.
 - (a) The President, the Director of Central Intelligence, a member of the NSC, or perhaps amore likely—the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to render an informed decision on UFO policy in a proper context of defense.
 - (b) To include in any NIE on Soviet UFO decoy capability, missile, warhead, and booster vehicle propulsion and range factors from OSI as augmented intelligence for final intelligence product.
2. Terms of reference be defined by the Board of National Estimates. This group can initiate study or as usually the case, tact in response to a specific UFO date request from an intelligence consumer.
 - (a) Define the problem, divide into feasible components and then assign to appropriate intelligence agencies. Staff studies should include the Office of National Estimates and assign a representative to integrate material received.
3. A straight estimate be divided into two categories—the knowable and the unknowable.
 - (a) Coordinate UFO data collection with Project Blue Book at the Top Secret level and forward to OSI.
 - (b) Task military intelligence with requirements for forwarding raw UFO reports to OSI through the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
 - (c)Coordinate feedback to appropriate intelligence agencies.
4. Ultrasecret net estimate handled by the NSC rather than the Board of Estimates or the U.S. Intelligence Board.
5. The Watch Committee and National Indications Center be allowed to alert CIA of any unusual or impending changes in Soviet power structure through a crash estimate when needed.
6. A Joint Committee be formed to appraise the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Material Assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee (MAJIC) in the coordination between CIA and authorized intelligence agencies concerned with physical and trace evidence recovery operations in foreign countries.

Past and current members of the Council of Foreign Affairs be brought in the intelligence loop on an on call basis to provide quick and ready reviews to hard questions regarding Soviet back channel contacts and sources on advancing Soviet and allied progress in missiles, spacecraft, launch vehicles, payload capability and political discussion among their scientific defense communities.

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A DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

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- General Intelligence Agency. In other words, those regions of space
- with a few hours of time and air or atmosphere cannot be well led to
- end with less than confidence, then of any time in the past 30
- years. The future of U.S. intelligence is a crucial policy issue.
- That first that been ignored in the principle of the sovereignty
- over air space has been accepted by too many unqualified attempts
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PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT POLICY AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

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