

[CIA]

ANNEX C

1. As a result of the top secret meeting held on 14 July, 1949, with the President at Blair House, the subject of U.S. sharing knowledge of MAJESTIC findings was discussed. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was temporarily recalled to Washington, was asked to formulate a policy of defense for U.S. and NATO. The members of the Combined Policy Committee, namely Acheson, Johnson, and [redacted] represented the Administration, and members of the Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, also participated. The Administration proposed that: "know how" of new technologies would be shared with [redacted] an agreement for pooling of information; and that an unspecified number of flying saucer component parts be stored in [redacted] by U.S. members of MAJESTIC.
2. Article 51 provisions were studied and [redacted] in light of the [redacted] reaction [redacted] by the [redacted] approved by [redacted].
3. We consider the President's commitment to the Rio Conference an essential move in the right direction for the collective defense efforts.
4. Use of atomic weapons has been considered as a last line of defense against a massive air assault on U.S. and allied countries. The President, Secretary of State Marshall, and Defense Secretary Forrestal, have agreed on consensus with other allied countries. This consensus led to the 16 November, 1947 meeting at the Pentagon with Secretary Forrestal, and Undersecretary of State Lovett.
5. Even with the co-operation of the Russians, such agreements would not produce the unified front so desired in the event such an attack would occur.
6. [redacted] er  
[redacted] move about as will,  
avoiding contact, evading radar, and out-flying the fastest aircraft,
7. The use of fighter aircraft for identification and contact with the visitors, has proved fruitless, as can be seen from the Mantell case. It is recommended that aircraft avoid close encounters and maintain a non-threatening approach when on interception missions.
8. The only successful [redacted] the forced landing [redacted] subsequent crash of their craft near the White Sands proving ground. Without the use of their advanced technology, communication on a [redacted] basis, is the only way a safe approach can be effected.

*Part of [redacted] files 1-1*

[redacted]

[redacted]

ANNEX C (Cont'd)

9. [redacted]

10. Maintaining the [MAJESTIC] security has been successful in part because of compartmental function of classified activities of the level achieved by the security system of the Manhattan Project, and new legislation protecting nuclear weapons development.

X 11. In protecting the security operations of [MAJESTIC], it has been necessary to [redacted] individuals who would compromise the intelligence efforts. While distasteful [redacted] at times, the use of [redacted] measures have been executed. The untimely death of Secretary Forrestal, was deemed necessary and regrettable. X

12. General Statement: If such a crisis in government failure to defend and assure the public's trust against an invasion from another planet, [redacted] that the following would occur: "The pattern is familiar—employment of subversive agents; infiltration tactics; incitement of disorder and chaos to disrupt normal economy and thereby to undermine popular confidence in government and leaders; seizure of authority without reference to the will of the people."

13. Referenced REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT [redacted] 1947, PARTS I-V, dated 19 September 1947, mentions: "In compliance with your directive . . . of 9 July 1947, the attached "REPORT ON FLYING SAUCERS" is respectfully submitted. In consonance with your instructions, advisors from State, Treasury, War and Navy Departments assisted me on a two month fact finding mission concerning the reality of other-world visitation. The principle areas were visited. Successful efforts were made to reach all levels of scientists and political thinkers as measured by their work in classified projects in defense and economics. Conferences were held with [redacted] approximately 1,200 memoranda and reports from intelligence and security individuals were received and considered. The report presents against a global background my estimates of the situation, current and projected, in U.S., and U.K., and recommendations deemed to be sound sources of action for formulating plans and policies concerning defenses of allied countries of the United States."

*Report on Flying Saucers*

S-37582

14. As a result of the Twining Report, the President was compelled to sign into law the National Security Act of 1947 which came into effect on 19 September. This did not help the DCI in carrying out the directives of the NSC in matters of intelligence collection concerning the flying saucer problem. The Intelligence Advisory Board was not allowing the new CIA to function as the primary collector of critical flying saucer data. [redacted]